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This paper studies vertical restraints in a duopoly market when retailers have 
private information on demand uncertainty. If both manufacturers are able to charge 
their retailers franchise fees, they will delegate the decision to determine retail prices to 
their retailers. If both manufacturers are unable to charge their retailers franchise fees, 
the degree of product differentiation plays an important role in equilibrium. If both 
products are more or less differentiated, both manufacturers will directly set the retail 
prices without delegation. If both products are extremely homogeneous, there will exist 
two equilibria; resale price maintenance (RPM) and delegation. 
From a social welfare standpoint, an efficient equilibrium depends on the degree of 
product differentiation as well as on the degree of demand uncertainty. If the degree of 
product differentiation is high, it is efficient for regulators to let manufacturers to be 
able to employ RPM, irrespective of demand uncertainty. If the degree of product 
differentiation is at the intermediate level, it is desirable that regulators allow a 
contract with a franchise fee. If both products are sufficiently homogeneous, it is 
efficient for regulators to prohibit vertical restraints. This implies that authorities may 
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1. Introduction 
It is rare for manufacturers to directly establish transactions with consumers. 
Generally speaking, retailers, as intermediaries, facilitate transactions between two 
parties because the retailers, which have a decent knowledge (or information) of 
regional (or local) markets, would be better at predicting the local market demand than 
manufacturers. Under the asymmetric information, the expected payoffs for channels 
will increase if manufacturers delegate the right to decide retail prices to their retailers. 
Thus, if manufacturers delegate the right to set retail prices to their retailers, it will 
have beneficial effects on manufacturers’ profitability, by allowing them to utilize 
valuable information. This paper examines vertical restraints under asymmetric 
information on demand uncertainty. 
Previous studies on vertical restraints have two mainstreams. One has been focused 
on understanding the relationship between a single manufacturer and a single retailer 
or on the relationship between a single manufacturer and multiple retailers3. The other 
has been focused on analyzing the competitive relationships between two 
manufacturers that contract with an exclusive retailer4. The first framework has been 
provided in justification of employing vertical restraints. RPM is employed in order to 
extract the existence of externalities of retailers’ services [Telsor(1960)]. RPM can solve 
the problem of double marginalization [Spengler(1950)]. On the assumption that 
retailers have private information on the state of demand, franchise contract and linear 
pricing are more desirable than that of RPM [Rey and Tirole(1986)], even with a single 
manufacturer. 
The second framework has examined that the vertical restraints might not be 
absolutely favorable in an oligopoly. Therefore, earlier findings in the literatures 
dealing with vertical separation in oligopoly have mainly shown that delegation is 
superiority to vertical restraints. Vertical restraints are not necessarily desirable if both 
the products are sufficiently homogeneous and the fixed retailing costs are sufficiently 
high under conditions of demand uncertainty, but with symmetric information 
[Gal-Or(1991a)]. 
The problem of vertical restraints has also been dealt with under conditions of 
asymmetric information. Delegation leads to a trade-off relationship between 
information benefits and information costs. From the standpoint of contract theory, 
                                                  
3 See, for instance, Spengler(1950), Telser(1960), Gould and Preston(1965), Matheson 
and Winter(1984), Bresnahan and Reiss(1985), Rey and Tirole(1986), Nariu(1996), 
Deneckere, Marvel and Peck(1997), Utaka(2003), and so on. 
4  See, Gal-Or(1991a, 1991b), Bonanno and Vickers(1988), Rey and Stiglitz(1988), 
McGuire and Staelin(1983), Fershtman and Judd(1987), and so on.  
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vertical restraints may be efficient if both products are sufficiently differentiated and/or 
the degree of demand uncertainty is sufficiently large under asymmetric information 
[Gal-Or(1991b)]. Unlike this model, our paper approaches the question of whether 
manufacturers delegate the decision on retail prices or not by introducing a trade-off 
relationship between the utilization of valuable information and double marginalization. 
Delegating the retail price decision to retailers has the beneficial effect of alleviating 
competition by taking advantage of valuable information. However, it also brings about 
the detrimental effect of double marginalization. 
This paper examines the vertical restraints under demand uncertainty. The following 
conclusions emerge from our analysis. Under asymmetric information about the state of 
demand, if manufacturers can charge the franchise fees to their retailers, there exists a 
unique equilibrium in which they delegate the pricing decision to their retailers. Under 
the circumstance that manufacturers cannot charge the franchise fees, and if both 
products are extremely homogeneous, there exist dual equilibria; a delegation 
equilibrium and an RPM equilibrium. If both products are somewhat differentiated, 
they will enforce retail prices without delegating the right to determine retail prices. 
From a social welfare standpoint, it is desirable for regulators to permit RPM if both 
product differentiation and demand uncertainty are sufficiently high. It is desirable for 
regulators to prohibit RPM and franchise contracts, if product differentiation is 
sufficiently low. It is also desirable for regulators only to permit franchise contracts only 
if product differentiation is intermediate. 
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the model and 
analyzes the contracts with franchise fees. Section 3 examines the contract without 
franchise fees. In section 4, we extend our model to examine an augmented game with 
equilibria derived from the above sections. In Section 5, we analyze how vertical 
restraints should be controlled from a social welfare and consumer welfare standpoint. 
Concluding remarks are in Section 6. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a duopoly market that consists of two manufacturers and two retailers. Two 
products produced by the manufacturers are differentiated. Both manufacturers sell 
their products to their own retailers. The demand function for manufacturer i is given 
by: 
 
jijibandabppxaq jii ≠=≤≤>+−+= ;,,,, 21100              (1) 
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where qi is the quantity produced by manufacturer i, pi and pj are the retail prices 
charged for product i and j, respectively, and x5 is a random variable that is distributed 
with mean 0 and variance . The assumption that b≥0 implies that the two products 
are substitutes. The parameter b measures the degree of differentiation between two 
products, i.e., as b approaches one, the products become less differentiated. Conversely, 
as b approaches zero, the products become more differentiated. For simplicity of 
exposition, it is assumed that both manufacturers and retailers are all risk-neutral, and 
that the marginal costs for producing both products are normalized to zero. We also 
assume that each manufacturer prohibits its retailer from transacting and distributing 
the product produced by the rival manufacturer. 
2σ
This paper considers a game consisting of three stages. At stage one, each 
manufacturer offers a contract to its own retailer. The contract is composed of three 
variables; franchise fee, decision-right with regard to retail price, and wholesale price. 
At stage two, the state of demand is realized and the realized state of demand can be 
observed only by retailers. At stage three, each retailer (or manufacturer) sets their 
retail prices. When manufacturers employ RPM at the first stage, notice that retailers 
will not make any decision, apart from accepting the contract offered by their 
manufacturers whenever their profits are satisfied by non-negative condition.  
 
2.1. Franchise Contract with Delegation 
We consider the case in which each manufacturer is able to charge franchise fee and 
delegates the right to decide the retail prices to its retailer. At stage three, retailer i 
chooses the retail price pi so as to maximize its profits as follows: 
 
iijiiiiiiii ptrwFbppxawpFqwpyMax ..,))(()( −+−+−=−−=       (2) 
 
where wi is the wholesale price and Fi is the franchise fee. The retail price that 
maximizes Eq. (2) is independent of the value of Fi. Therefore, retailer i chooses its 
retail price as the function of wholesale prices as follows: 
 
                                                  
5 We assume that the boundary condition is satisfied. It guarantees that each 













2         (3-1) 
 
The retail price is derived by differentiating the objective function Eq. (2) with respect 
to pi and by solving two reaction functions for (pi,pj) in terms of (wi,wj). Substituting it 
into Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we obtain the quantity qi, the expected quantity Eqi, and the 









































22 σ     (3-4) 
 
 At the first stage, manufacturer i chooses a wholesale price wi and a franchise fee Fi so 
as to maximize its expected profit for a given wj, which is selected by the rival 
manufacturer j. Manufacturer i chooses the retail price so as to maximize its profits as 
follows: 
 
iijiiijiiii FwtrwwwEytsFwwEqwEMax ,...,),(..,),( 0≥+=π           (4) 
 





































The equilibrium wholesale price for manufacturer i is derived by differentiating the 
objective function (5) with respect to wi and by solving the two reaction functions for 








i −−=                                         (6-1) 
 
where the superscripts R and F respectively denote that the right to determine the 
retail price is delegated to the retailer and that each manufacturer is able to charge the 
franchise fee to their retailers. Substituting Eq. (6-1) into Eq. (3-1), Eq. (3-2) and Eq. (5) 
gives the equilibrium price, equilibrium quantity and equilibrium expected payoff, 
when the state of demand is x, respectively. 
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2.2 Resale Price Maintenance with Franchise Fee 
 We now turn to the case in which each manufacturer is able to enforce the wholesale 
price as well as the retail price. However, manufacturers have no information on the 
state of demand. Therefore, they have no other option than to set the retail price and 
the wholesale price equally, without regard to the state of demand. Therefore, retailers 
do not make any decision, apart from accepting the contract offered by their 
manufacturers, when their profits are satisfied by non-negative conditions. In these 
circumstances, manufacturer i chooses wi, pi, and Fi so as to maximize its profits for the 
given wj, pj, and Fi selected by the rival manufacturer. Manufacturer i chooses wi, pi, 
and Fi so as to maximize its profits as follows: 
 
iiiiiiiiiiii FandpwtrwFEqwpEytsFEqwEMax ,,...,)(.., 0≥−−=+=π  (7) 
 
Noticing that the constraint condition of Eq. (7) is binding, we rewrite it as follows: 
 
ijiiiii ptrwbppapEqpEMax ...),( +−==π                         (8) 
 
By differentiating the objective function Eq. (8) with respect to pi, and by solving the 
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i −= 2                                          (9-1) 
 
Substituting Eq. (9-1) into Eq. (1) and Eq. (8), we have, respectively, the equilibrium 
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where the superscript M implies the case in which each manufacturer is able to enforce 
its retail price. Comparing Eq. (9-3) with Eq. (6-4), we obtain the following result under 























Lemma 1. If both manufacturers are able to charge franchise fees to their retailers, they 
will delegate the right to determine the retail prices to their retailers. They enjoy higher 
payoffs from delegation than from RPM. 
 
Lemma 1 gives rise to us of three facts. Firstly, delegating the retail prices to their 
retailers induces the retailers to set retail prices suitable to the realized state of demand. 
Secondly, it plays a role in mitigating competition between manufacturers under 
vertical separation. Thirdly, contracts with franchise fees are designated to extract 
retailer surplus acquired by dominant information. We suppose that manufacturers also 
have the information on the state of demand. If manufacturers are able to enforce RPM, 











                                                  
6 When b=0 and σ2=0, the equality of the equation is satisfied. 
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where the superscript X denotes the case that manufacturers completely know the state 
of demand. The above equation implies that information rents for retailers correspond 
to  .)2/( 22 b−σ
 
2.3 Delegation vs. RPM 
We consider the case wherein manufacturer i employs delegation with a franchise 
contract, while manufacturer j employs RPM with a franchise contract. At the third 
stage, retailer i chooses pi so as to maximize its profit for the given wi, pj and Fj 
 
iijiiiiiiii ptrwFbppxawpFqwpyMax ..,))(()( −+−+−=−−=       (10) 
 
Retailer i chooses its retail price pi as a function of both its wholesale price wi and the 
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On the other hand, manufacturer j, who does not know the state of demand, chooses pj 
so as to maximize its profit for the rival’s given retail price pi 
 
jiijjjj ptrwbEppapEqpMax ..),( +−==π                     (12) 
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7 The expected payoffs can be produced by setting wi=wj=0 and Fi=Fj=(a2+σ2)/(2-b)2. 
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Substituting Eq. (11-2) into Eq. (13) and solving two reaction functions for (pi,pj) in 
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Substituting Eq. (14-1) and Eq. (14-2) into Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), when the state of demand 
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At the first stage, manufacturer i chooses wi so as to maximize its profits.  
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Substituting Eq. (17-1) into Eq. (14-1), Eq. (14-2), Eq. (14-3), Eq. (14-5), and Eq. (16), the 
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corresponding equilibrium retail prices, quantities, franchising fee, and expected 
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where the superscript A denotes the asymmetric case that manufacturer i delegates the 
right to determine retail price to its retailer and the other manufacturer employs RPM.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In order to decide the problem of whether manufacturers will choose delegation with 
franchise fee or RPM, it is necessary to compare payoffs described above. All payoffs are 
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Proposition 1. In duopolistic equilibrium under the equation (1), if manufacturers are 
able to charge franchise fees to their retailers, they will delegate the right to determine 
the retail prices to their retailers. They enjoy higher payoffs from delegation than they 
                                                  
8 When b=0 and σ2=0, the equality is satisfied. 
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would have from RPM. 
 
3. Contract with No Franchise Fee 
In this section, we examine the case in which manufacturers are unable to charge 
franchise fees to their retailers. 
 
3.1 Delegation with No Franchise Fee 
 As was explained in the above section, the retail prices at stage three are independent 
of franchise fees. Therefore, Eq. (3) indicates the equilibrium retail prices independent 
of the franchise contract. Then, at the first stage, manufacturer i chooses wi in order to 
maximize its expected profit for a given wj, which is selected by the rival manufacturer. 
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By differentiating the objective function (18) with respect to wi and by solving the two 
reaction functions for (wi,wj) in terms of (wi(wj), wj(wi)), manufacturer i chooses its 
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Substituting Eq. (19-1) into Eq. (3-1), Eq. (3-2) and Eq. (18) gives, respectively, the 
equilibrium price, the equilibrium quantity, the equilibrium expected payoff and the 
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Lemma 2. Consider the case wherein manufacturers are unable to charge franchise fees 
to their retailers. In duopolistic equilibrium under equation (1), if b>b1, they will 
delegate the right to determine the retail prices to their retailers. They enjoy higher 
payoffs from delegation than from RPM. 
 
We omit RPM with no franchise fee because that case produces the same results as 
explained in the previous section for RPM with a franchise fee.  
 
3.2 Delegation vs. RPM with No Franchise Fees 
We turn to an asymmetric case where manufacturer i gives the right to decide the 
retail price to its retailer, whereas manufacturer j employs RPM at stage one. The 
equilibrium, at stage three, is identical to Eq. (14-1) and Eq. (14-2). At the first stage, 
manufacturer i chooses the wholesale price wi so as to maximize its profits as follows:  
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where the superscripted symbol ^ denotes the asymmetric case with no franchise fee, in 
which manufacturer i delegates the right to determine retail price to its retailer and 
manufacturer j employs RPM. When the equilibrium wholesale price is given by Eq. 
(21-1), the equilibrium retail prices, quantities, expected payoffs and franchising fee are 
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[Table 2 here] 
 
In order to understand the problem of whether manufacturers will choose RPM or not, 
it will be useful to compare the payoffs described above. All payoffs are summarized in 
Table 2. Noticing that 0≤b≤1, we obtain the following results: 
 









     
 
Proposition 2. Consider the case in which both manufacturers are unable to charge 
franchise fees to their retailers. In duopolistic equilibrium under the equation (1), if 
b<b2, there exists a unique equilibrium that both manufacturers employ RPM. If b>b2, 
there exist two equilibria: Delegation and RPM. In the former, both delegate the right to 
determine their retail price to their retailers. In the latter, both employ RPM. In 
multiple equilibria, delegation payoffs are higher than those from RPM. 
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Proposition 2 has the following implications. If the detrimental effect of double 
marginalization is extremely large, when there are no franchise fees, both 
manufacturers employ RPM. The reason is that the retail price is lower with RPM than 
with delegation. However, if both products are sufficiently homogeneous (b>b2), it may 
be beneficial for retailers to employ retail prices. In other words, delegation brings more 
payoffs to manufacturers by playing a role in alleviating competitions between them. 
 
4. The Augmented Game 
 We obtained three equilibria in Section 2 and 3: delegation with franchise fees, RPM 
with no franchise fees and delegation with no franchise fees. We shall further examine 
an augmented game with these equilibria. The augmented game requires us to compare 
payoffs of delegation with franchise fees with those of delegation with no franchise fees. 
The retail price and quantity in a franchise contract are produced by Eq. (3-1) and Eq. 
(3-2), respectively. We suppose that manufacturer i employs delegation with franchise 
fees whereas manufacturer j enforces delegation with no franchise fees. The reaction 
functions for manufacturers i and j are described by Eq. (6-1) and Eq. (17-1), 
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We denote by #RF and #R an asymmetric case in which manufacturer i is able to charge 
franchise fee and manufacturer j is unable to charge franchise fee, respectively. 
Substituting Eq. (22-1) and Eq. (22-2) into Eq. (5) and Eq. (18) gives the expected 
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[Table 3 here] 
 
From Table 3, when 0≤b≤1 and σ2>0, we obtain the following results. 
 
},max{ ^RMARF EEE πππ >  
},max{ ^# RMRF EEE πππ >  
},max{ #RAMRF EEE πππ >  
 
Therefore, each manufacturer will always employ Delegation with franchise fees 
regardless of the rival manufacturer’s strategy.  
 
Proposition 3. In the duopolistic equilibrium under the equation (1), when 0≤b≤1 and 
σ2>0, each manufacturer will always employ delegation with a franchise fee, regardless 
of the rival manufacturer’s strategy.  
 
However, it is possible to produce the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Suppose that b=1. Then, 
the matrix in Table 3 can be rewritten as the matrix in a Table 4. From the matrix in 
Table 4, when both manufacturers are able to charge the franchise fees to their retailers, 
their payoffs will be 2a2+σ2, whereas their payoffs with no franchise fees will be 3a2. 
Essentially, this case also occurs when both products are sufficiently homogeneous. In 
















Note that the function f(b) is strictly increasing in the interval 0≤b≤1, and it is zero 
when b=0.81352. Therefore, if the degree of products differentiation or demand 
uncertainty is sufficiently large, it is obvious that the Prisoners’ Dilemma equilibrium 
will not exist.  
 
5. Vertical Restraints and Social Welfare 
In the previous section, we analyzed the augmented game. This section will now deal 
with the three equilibria from the standpoint of social welfare and consumer welfare. 














Substituting Eq. (9-2), Eq. (6-3) and Eq. (19-3) into the above function produces the 
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From Eq. (24-1), Eq. (24-2), and Eq. (24-3), under the condition that 0≤b≤1, we obtain 
the following results. 
 
RRFM CSCSCS >>  
 
From the standpoint of consumer welfare, it is most beneficial for both manufacturers 
to employ RPM. However, Proposition 3 means that if each manufacturer is able to 
charge franchise fees to its retailer, it employs a unique equilibrium that each 
manufacturer gives its retailer the authority to decide retail price. Even if the 
equilibrium is not the first-best for consumers, payoffs from delegation with franchise 
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fees will be larger than those from delegation with no franchise fees. If both products 
are somewhat differentiated, both manufacturers will employ RPM. From the 
consumer’s perspective, this is the most efficient selection, and it will increase the 
consumer welfare. Therefore, the authorities can realize an efficient equilibrium by 
prohibiting franchise contracts in these cases.  
 
Proposition 4. From a social welfare standpoint, a regulator can make the following 
efficient decision on vertical restraint. Given that 0≤b≤1, 











))((  and b<0.679, it is efficient for the regulator 












−++−+<σ , it is efficient for the regulator to permit 
manufacturers to employ RPM.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Proposition 4 implies that if product differentiation is not at a high level, delegation 
with no franchise fees (or delegation with franchise fees) is more efficient than the 
efficiency of RPM, from a social welfare standpoint. The reason is that employing RPM 
deteriorates social welfare due to demand uncertainty. On the other hand, if product 
differentiation is sufficiently high, delegation deteriorates social welfare due to double 
marginalization. We present simple numerical examples to understand Proposition 4. 
 




,RRFM TSTSTS >>  if  b<0.518 
,RMRF TSTSTS >>  if  0.518<b<0.653 
,MRRF TSTSTS >>  if  0.653<b<0.679 
,MRFR TSTSTS >>  if  0.679<b 
 
Finally, we postulate that both the degree of demand uncertainty and the degree of 
product differentiation are given by the above simple example. How can the authorities 
achieve the most efficient results from the viewpoint of social welfare? If the authorities 
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can not regulate manufacturers’ actions, manufacturers will charge franchising fees and 
delegate the right to decide their retail prices. When products differentiation is 
occurring to an intermediate degree (0.51822<b<0.67896), the authorities can 
accomplish the most efficient equilibrium by not enforcing any regulation. When both 
products are substantially differentiated (b<0.51822), the authorities can induce 
manufacturers to employ RPM by prohibiting franchising charges. When both products 
are somewhat homogeneous (0.67896< b), the authorities can implement an efficient 
equilibrium by forbidding RPM as well as franchising charges. Until now, we have 
examined how authorities can realize the most efficient equilibrium by employing 
proper vertical restraints, in any given case. 
 
Example 2. When 320 −<≤ b , total surpluses in equilibria are always satisfying the 
following relationship. 
 
RRFM TSTSTS >>  
 
Example 3. When , the relationships among total surpluses in equilibria 
are given by: 
4/5/ 22 ≥aσ
 
,MRFR TSTSTS >>  if  b>0.679 
,MRRF TSTSTS >>  if 679032 .<≤− b  
,RRFM TSTSTS >>  if  320 −<≤ b  
 
So far, the most efficient policy for social welfare has been reviewed according to 
Proposition 4 and by giving some numerical examples. However, it is evident that the 
actions that are desirable for manufacturers are different from the ones that are 
efficient for social welfare. Therefore, the regulator has to implement vertical restraints 
properly, according to the degree of product differentiation and the degree of demand 
uncertainty. Comparing the results obtained in section 4 with the above-mentioned 
results, it is desirable for regulator to permit RPM to manufacturers, if both product 
differentiation and demand uncertainty are sufficiently high. This means that the cost 
of double marginalization is too high to delegate the right to decide the retail price to 
retailers. The result holds a convexity relationship between product differentiation and 
demand uncertainty. It is also desirable for the regulator to prohibit RPM and franchise 
contracts, if product differentiation is sufficiently low. This means that the beneficial 
effect of taking advantage of valuable information is superior to the detrimental one of 
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double marginalization. It is also desirable for the regulator only to permit only 
franchise contracts if product differentiation is intermediate. This means that the 
superiority of delegation with franchise contracts over RPM is holds true in this 
domain. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper examined the vertical restraints under demand uncertainty. The following 
conclusions emerged from our analysis. Under incomplete information on the state of 
demand, if manufacturers can charge franchise fees to their retailers, there exists a 
unique equilibrium in which they delegate the pricing decision to their retailers. Under 
the circumstance in which manufacturers can not charge franchise fees, if both products 
are extremely homogeneous, there exist dual equilibria: a delegation equilibrium and 
an RPM equilibrium. If both products are somewhat differentiated, they will enforce 
retail prices without delegating the right to determine retail prices. It is desirable for 
regulator to permit RPM to manufacturers, from a social welfare standpoint, if both 
product differentiation and demand uncertainty are sufficiently high. It is desirable for 
regulator to prohibit RPM and franchise contracts, if product differentiation is 
sufficiently low. It is also desirable for the regulator to permit only franchise contracts, 
if product differentiation is intermediate. 
Much of the previous relevant literatures have been focused on the justification of 
employing vertical restraints within a single channel. Another approach has been 
illustrated here, in that vertical restraints might not be desirable in an oligopolistic 
environment. The conclusion of our paper leaves the question as to why vertical 
restraints should always be prohibited. 
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• The superscript A implies the asymmetric case.
• The superscript F implies the producer charges 
franchise fee to its retailer.
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 Table 4: Payoffs of the Augmented Game (b=1)
(2a2+σ2,2a2+σ2)(162a2/49+σ2, 75a2/49)(9a2/8+σ2/4, 25a2/16)RF
(75a2/49, 162a2/49+σ2)(3a2, 3a2)(3a2/4, 9a2/4)R



































Figure 1. Efficient Decision on Retail Price
from Social Welfare standpoint
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